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Monitoring, Reporting, and Recalling
Defective Financial Products
Daniel Schwarczt
INTRODUCTION
Firms that sell tangible consumer products are obligated to
monitor the safety of those products even after they are sold to
consumers.' These companies are also required to report to
federal regulators any information they obtain that reasonably
supports the conclusion that their products present undue safety
risks.2 Finally, manufacturers of tangible consumer products are
encouraged-and in some cases, required-to correct potential
safety problems through mechanisms such as a product recall. 3
These obligations of firms to monitor, report, and correct safety-
related product defects that come to light after sale are premised
on the fact that many such problems are not fully understood
prior to sale. 4 At the same time, individual firms are usually
better positioned than either the government or consumers to
detect these problems.5 By both encouraging and requiring post-
sale monitoring, reporting, and correction of product safety
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Visiting
Professor of Law, UCLA Law School. Many thanks to Anita Bernstein, Prentiss Cox,
Angela Littwin, Brett McDonnell, Saule Omarova, and Alan White for helpful comments
on drafts of this Article.
1 See 15 USC § 2064.
2 See 15 USC § 2064(b)(3). In particular, firms must alert the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, which is the agency with authority over recalls of tangible consumer
products. See 15 USC §§ 2053, 2064(d).
3 See 15 USC § 2064(d).
' See Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight?, 14 J L
Econ & Org 325, 327 (1998) (examining the question "how much of the information
which is known ex post but was not available to the manufacturer ex ante should be
utilized in determining the reasonableness of the product's design").
" See generally id.
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problems, law and regulation may be able to help proactively
avoid consumer accidents. 6
Unlike firms selling tangible consumer products, firms that
sell consumer financial products are generally under no
obligation to proactively monitor, report, or correct potential
problems with their products that manifest themselves after the
time of sale. Instead, most consumer financial protections are
aimed at regulating sellers' behavior and product features prior
to, or at the point of, sale.7 Yet as with tangible consumer
products, the risk of consumer harm resulting from the sale of
financial products cannot always be accurately gauged until
after sale. And as with tangible consumer products, firms are
usually comparatively well-positioned to detect potential
problems with their financial products. Finally, as with tangible
consumer products, there is at least a theoretical possibility that
law and regulation may be able to limit the incidence of
"financial accidents" by requiring firms to monitor markets for
their occurrence, report such events to regulators, and
proactively safeguard against their reoccurrence.
To be sure, the analogy between the post-sale obligations of
firms that sell tangible consumer goods and those that sell retail
financial products is both imperfect and limited. Although the
subprime credit crisis demonstrated that financial products can
cause devastating harm to consumers,8 they obviously cannot
directly physically harm consumers as can chainsaws or
lawnmowers. 9 Even more importantly, many of the risks created
by retail financial products are important features of, rather
than defects in, the product.10 Consequently, it would be
impractical and unhelpful to simply suggest that financial firms
monitor their products on a post-sale basis for "accidents" or
"safety problems," in the same broad way that the law governing
tangible consumer products requires.
6 See Teresa M. Schwartz and Robert S. Adler, Product Recalls: A Remedy in Need
of Repair, 34 Case W Res L Rev 401, 462-63 (1984) (discussing various potential benefits
of the product recall remedy, if it were implemented more effectively).
See Part II.A.
8 See Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, The Subprime Virus: Reckless
Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps 10 (Oxford 2011).
9 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 Democracy 8, 8 (Summer 2007). See
also Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U Pa L Rev 1, 3-4
(2008); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev 1389, 1397 (2007).
'0 See Schwarcz, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1453-56 (cited in note 9).
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This Article nonetheless considers the possibility that
consumer financial protections can profitably draw on the
product safety regime to impose post-sale obligations on firms.
In doing so, the Article focuses on the expanding obligation of
firms to sell financial products suitable to consumers' needs.
This principle of consumer financial protection shares some key
features with the law governing product safety: suitability
violations can be difficult for firms to detect or police against at
the time of sale, even though firms may be relatively well-
equipped to identify and mitigate compliance failures on a post-
sale basis.
These analytical similarities create the prospect that
suitability regimes can be improved by drawing on post-sale
product safety principles. The Article illustrates how this
approach might work by reconsidering the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau's (CFPB) rules implementing the Dodd-Frank
Act's "ability to repay" requirement for mortgages. For instance,
the Article suggests that these rules could require creditors to
assess the accuracy of their ability to repay models using
historical data on actual default rates. To the extent that such
back-testing revealed substantial deficiencies in the creditor's
underwriting model, the creditor could either be required to
report this problem to the CFPB or be incentivized to do so
through a limitation on liability or regulatory exposure. Finally,
in appropriate cases, the creditor might even be required or
encouraged to offer mortgage modifications to consumers who at
the time of sale were incorrectly determined to have an ability to
repay.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes firms' post-
sale legal obligations and incentives to proactively monitor,
report, and correct potential safety problems with their tangible
consumer products. It also describes several features of
consumer product markets that can be used to justify imposing
such post-sale obligations on sellers and manufacturers. Part II
argues that these features are also found in certain consumer
financial protection settings, focusing on the particular case of
suitability rules. Part III then demonstrates how these
similarities might be exploited to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of certain consumer financial protection rules, using
the CFPB's recent ability to repay rules as an example. Part IV
concludes by suggesting that various consumer financial
protection issues other than suitability might also be improved
409] 411
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by imposing post-sale monitoring, reporting, and correction
obligations on sellers of financial products.
I. POST-SALE MONITORING, REPORTING, AND CORRECTION FOR
TANGIBLE CONSUMER PRODUCTS
The American legal system requires firms that sell tangible
consumer products to monitor the safety of those products after
they are sold, report to regulators evidence of any potential
safety problems, and take corrective action to mitigate the
impact of any such problems. Part A describes these monitoring,
reporting, and mitigation requirements. Part B then articulates
several potential justifications for these rules." First, firms and
regulators cannot fully anticipate or appreciate product safety
problems when products are initially sold to consumers. Second,
firms that manufacture and distribute tangible consumer
products enjoy some comparative advantages over governments
and consumers in learning new, post-sale information regarding
their product's safety. Third, regulators armed with new safety
information about products can require firms to take corrective
action that may efficiently mitigate safety problems.
A. An Overview of Product Manufacturers' Duties to Monitor,
Report, and Correct Safety Problems
Sellers of tangible consumer products are required to report
and correct known safety problems with their products. 12 In
particular, the Consumer Product Safety Act 13 requires
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to report any
information they acquire that reasonably supports the
conclusion that one of their products contains a defect that could
create a substantial product hazard, poses unreasonable risks,
or fails to comply with voluntary or mandatory product safety
rules.14 Upon receiving such a report, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) makes a preliminary determination
" Whether these justifications are ultimately convincing depends on various details
that are beyond this Article's scope.
12 Of course, sellers and manufacturers of various other types of goods also face
various post-sale obligations. These other categories of goods include foods, drugs, and
automobiles. See Schwartz and Adler, 34 Case W Res L Rev at 402 (cited in note 6).
13 Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), Pub L No 92-573, 86 Stat 1207 (1972),
codified at 15 USC § 2051 et seq.
14 CPSA § 15, 82 Stat at 1221, codified at 15 USC § 2064(b).
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of whether the underlying product presents a substantial hazard
or risk. 15 If the product presents such a danger, then the CPSC
may order the reporting company to implement a corrective
action plan that includes remedial action, possibly up to a
"recall" of a product.16 In practice, the CPSC rarely mandates
corrective action; voluntary product recalls are much more
common.'7 But as Anita Bernstein points out, many voluntary
recalls are actually the result of an implicit or explicit threat by
the CPSC to issue a mandatory recall.' 8
In addition to establishing these requirements, the CPSC
also incentivizes companies to report and correct product safety
problems promptly. Under the CPSC's "fast track" program, the
agency generally refrains from making a preliminary
determination regarding a product's risks if the company
implements effective corrective action within twenty days of
filing a report with the CPSC.19 Avoiding an adverse
preliminary determination helps to limit negative publicity,
litigation risks, and the costs of complying with a mandatory
corrective action order. Companies are excluded from the
program if the CPSC believes that they delayed reporting a
safety problem for any reason, including preparing a voluntary
corrective action plan that would be more likely to be accepted
under the "fast track" program. 20 Collectively, these rules
encourage companies to report and resolve safety problems
quickly, as doing so promotes faster resolution of potential
regulatory and safety problems while avoiding the potential risk
that the CPSC will compel firms to take corrective action.21
The CPSC's reporting rules also encourage, and to some
extent require, firms to proactively monitor consumer markets
for potential dangers associated with their products. Firms are
deemed to have acquired information about the safety risks of
their products when that information "is received by an
'5 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Recall Handbook 14 (CPSC 2012), online
at http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/103098/8002.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
16 Id at 16-18.
"7 Louis R. Frumer, Marvin I. Friedman, and Cary S. Sklaren, Products Liability
§ 57.04 (Matthew Bender 2012).
18 See Anita Bernstein, Voluntary Recalls, 2013 U Chi Legal F 359, 367.
19 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Conditions Under Which the Staff Will
Refrain From Making Preliminary Hazard Determinations, 62 Fed Reg 39827 (1997).
20 See id.
21 See id.
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employee or official of the firm who may reasonably be expected
to be capable of appreciating the significance of that
information."22 Even more importantly, the CPSC deems a firm
to know information that "it would have known had it exercised
due care in analyzing reports of injury or consumer complaints,
or in evaluating warranty returns, reports of experts, in-house
engineering analyses, or any other information."23 These rules
mean that firms can be in violation of their reporting
requirements if they fail to reasonably monitor markets for
safety problems. The CPSC also explicitly encourages firms to
"develop a system for maintaining and reviewing information
about their products that might suggest" product safety
problems.24
B. Rationales for Post-Sale Obligations to Monitor, Report, and
Correct Product Safety Problems
Many product safety problems cannot be anticipated or fully
appreciated when products are first broadly sold to consumers. 25
Often, this is simply because knowledge about the product itself
is imperfect; the strength and resiliency of materials, the quality
of manufacturing, and the drawbacks of product design are all
subject to incorrect assessment ex ante. In other cases, firms
may fail to evaluate safety problems because they do not
anticipate consumer use patterns: consumers may
systematically use products in ways that were not intended or
expected, but which create unanticipated dangers. For instance,
unwary consumers may use an electronic device such as a blow-
dryer in the bathroom unless they are warned of the dangers of
doing so. And in yet other cases, product safety may change
because of changes in the environment in which the product is
used-for instance, a tire may prove unsafe only once a new type
of paving method becomes widespread. Such limitations on pre-
sale safety assessments create a possible need for post-sale
22 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Recall Handbook at 8 (cited in note 15).
23 Id at 9.
2 Id at 7.
see Omri Ben-Shahar, How Liability Distorts Incentives of Manufacturers to
Recall Products *1 (U Mich Olin Center Working Paper No 05-002, Dec 2004), online at
http:Iwww.law.umich.edulcentersandprograms/lawandeconomicslabstracts/2005/Docum
ents/05-002benshahar.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("Usually, it is only over time, as
experience mounts and as aggregate data becomes reliable, that specific risks and harms
can be assessed, and precautions can be taken.").
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reevaluation of product safety, as new information may alter the
social costs and benefits of manufacturing and selling a
particular product.
Given the potential value of post-sale safety assessments, it
is sensible to allocate some of this burden to individual firms.
Such firms are often well-situated to identify consumer
accidents stemming from product safety problems. 26 This is for a
few reasons. First, firms often maintain ongoing relationships
with their customers, fielding consumer complaints, inquiries,
and comments. Firms do this to promote consumer satisfaction
with products, generate brand loyalty, and conduct market
research. Second, firms are often contacted directly-through
lawyers, newspapers, medical staff, or victims-when their
products are involved in an accident or other consumer harm.
Third, companies obviously have a deep understanding of the
intended and expected operations of their products. They are
therefore in a strong position to identify accidents that result
from unintended uses or unexpected behavior of their products.
Similar reasons may support compelling firms to report to
regulators sufficiently serious safety problems with products
that have already been sold. Such a requirement could help
channel important information to regulators, who may be able to
weigh the social costs and benefits of corrective action more
objectively than the individual firm. On the basis of this
information, regulators could compel the firm to take
appropriate corrective action. 27 Alternatively, and apparently
more commonly, firms that are forced to report safety-related
information to regulators might take preemptive corrective
action in order to avoid regulatory compulsion.28 Not only can
reporting promote more efficient and effective preemptive
corrective action, but it might also allow safety regulators to
26 See Consumer Product Safety Commission, Recall Handbook at 6-7 (cited in note
15) ("Although CPSC uses sources other than company reports to identify potentially
hazardous products, reporting by companies under section 15 can provide the most
timely and effective source of information about such products. This is because firms
often learn of potential product safety problems at an early stage.").
27 Assuming, of course, that the firm would not be willing to do so in the absence of
regulatory pressure. Consider A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case
for Product Liability, 123 Harv L Rev 1437, 1440 (2010) (noting that firms may have
market incentives, such as reputational gains, to correct safety problems with their
products).
28 See Bernstein, 2013 U Chi Legal F at 384 (cited in note 18).
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determine whether safety problems at one firm raise concerns
about the products of other firms.
Finally, in cases where products pose sufficiently large
safety problems, it is sensible to require companies to correct the
problem under the watch of regulators. A firm that
manufactures or designs a defective product is uniquely well-
situated to remedy resulting safety problems, given its
knowledge of the underlying product's design and materials.
Moreover, regulatory scrutiny of such efforts should generally be
effective, as regulators will be focused on a particular safety
problem that has already manifested itself on the market, rather
than a broad spectrum of potential risks. Moreover, placing this
burden on firms that fail to detect safety problems ex ante seems
likely to encourage better upfront precautions and research by
forcing them to internalize the cost of post-sale corrective action.
Of course, the potential benefits of post-sale safety
assessment, reporting, and corrective action are hardly assured.
First, firms may be excessively reluctant to report or correct
safety problems with products already in the hands of
consumers if doing so can increase the risk of litigation. 29 One
potential approach to mitigating this concern is to limit liability
when firms do take voluntary corrective action.30 Indeed, this is
the central idea of the CPSC's fast track program, which relieves
a firm of the burdens associated with a preliminary
determination if it proactively and voluntarily takes corrective
action. 31 This idea is also implicitly embodied in the current
products liability regime, which is more likely to impose
punitive damages on firms that fail to take corrective action
when safety problems become known.32
Another potential drawback of post-sale product safety
requirements is that they may cause firms to affirmatively avoid
learning about safety problems in the first place in order to limit
29 See Ben-Shahar, 14 J L Econ & Org at 340-44 (cited in note 4) (modeling this
effect); Schwartz and Adler, 34 Case W Res L Rev at 417 (cited in note 6) (noting that
recalls can stimulate additional lawsuits and bring adverse publicity); Steven Shavell,
Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk, 21 J Legal Stud 259, 261-
68 (1992) (modeling the impact that liability may have on the incentives of potential
injurers to learn about risk).
3 -See Ben-Shahar, 14 J L Econ & Org at 350-51 (cited in note 4).
31 See notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
32 See, for example, General Motors Corp v Johnston, 592 S2d 1054, 1060-61 (Ala
1992) (awarding punitive damages due to GMC's failure to recall vehicles despite
company knowledge of defective computer chips).
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the costs of mandated disclosure or remedial action.33 Firms
may, for instance, avoid proactively investigating possible
product risks or be more likely to accept innocent explanations
for consumer accidents. Of course, regulators can attempt to
forbid this behavior, just as they require disclosure in the first
place. Indeed, as described above, the CPSC does just this by
imputing to a firm knowledge of any product safety information
of which it should have been aware, irrespective of whether it
actually knew this information. Nonetheless, this type of
requirement is hard to enforce, as it requires measuring a firm's
actual efforts to monitor its products' safety relative to those
efforts it would have taken in the absence of a reporting
requirement. 34
II. EXTENDING POST-SALE OBLIGATIONS TO SUITABILITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL PRODUCTS
In recent years, innovation in consumer financial protection
has drawn heavily from the law governing the safety of tangible
consumer products. The most well-known example is the
creation of the CFPB, which was originally premised on the
notion that regulators should protect consumers against
"unsafe" financial products just as they have long protected
consumers against unsafe toaster ovens and automobiles. 35 The
power of this analogy is that inappropriate or exploitive
financial products can harm consumers in ways that are
comparable in magnitude to the physical harms that unsafe
tangible products can cause. And just as in the case of tangible
product safety, market mechanisms alone cannot be relied upon
to fully protect consumers because of limited consumer
information about financial product risks and well-known
cognitive biases and limitations among consumers. 36
To date, the analogy between tangible consumer products
and intangible financial products has largely been used to justify
3 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure
of Product Risks, 28 J L Econ & Org 360, 361 (2012).
4 See id at 363.
as See Warren, 5 Democracy at 8 (cited in note 9). The CFPB was established by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"). See
Dodd-Frank Title X, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 1955-2113 (2010), codified in
various sections of 12 USC.
3 Bar-Gill and Warren, 157 U Pa L Rev at 63, 69 (cited in note 9).
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more capacious pre-sale regulation of consumer financial
products. 37 But this analogy can be extended to the legal regime
governing post-sale monitoring, reporting, and correction of
consumer financial products as well. As discussed above, three
key features of tangible product markets potentially justify
imposing post-sale obligations on firms: (i) firms' uncertainty
about product safety at the time of sale; (ii) firms' informational
advantages in detecting the results of product safety problems;
and (iii) the potential value of reporting and correcting these
problems. This Part will evaluate how these features might
apply to consumer financial products by exploring how financial
product suitability rules could be expanded to encompass post-
sale monitoring, reporting, and corrective action requirements.
Whether the benefits of such an expansion would outweigh the
costs is beyond the scope of this Article.
A. A Brief Overview of Financial Product Suitability
Sellers of retail financial products in the insurance,
securities, and credit domains are often required to ensure that
the products they sell are appropriate for the specific consumers
who purchase them. This requirement is most familiar in the
securities context, where the SEC and various self-regulatory
bodies have long required broker-dealers to have reasonable
grounds for believing that the securities they sell to retail
consumers are suitable for customers' needs and situations.38
Suitability rules are of more recent vintage in the insurance
context, having originated from the application of securities
3 See Part II.A.
3 See Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex L Rev 1255, 1321-22 (2002). The most
recent version of this rule is Rule 2111 of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), which requires that a firm or associated person "have a reasonable basis to
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or
securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained through the
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to ascertain the customer's
investment profile." FINRA Rule 2111(a). This rule is largely similar to its predecessor
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and New York Stock Exchange rules.
See FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-25 (May 18, 2011), available on Westlaw at 2011 WL
2006978.
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to study whether a fiduciary standard should be
extended to broker-dealers as well. See Dodd-Frank § 914, 124 Stat at 1830. See also
Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U Pitt L Rev 439, 444 (2010). Of
course, if such a standard were extended to brokers, it would still require that brokers
ensure that products sold to clients were suitable for their need and situation.
418 [ 2013
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regulations to hybrid insurance-securities products such as
variable annuities and life insurance. 39 In recent years, the
model regulations of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) have extended suitability requirements
to the sale of annuities of all types (including those that are not
subject to federal securities law), 40 as well as to the sale of long-
term care insurance.41 And, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act 4 2
and the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009,43 a limited version of the suitability
requirement will soon apply to providers of certain mortgages
and credit cards, who will be required to ensure that consumers
have "a reasonable ability to repay" loans or credit limits that
are extended to them.44
39 See Engel and McCoy, 80 Tex L Rev at 1321 (cited in note 38). See also NASD
Notice to Members 00-44 (June 16, 2000), available on Westlaw at 2000 WL 1375112
(establishing securities-like regulation for hybrid insurance-securities products); NASD
Notice to Members 99-35 (May 1999), available on Westlaw at 1999 WL 33176526;
NASD Notice to Members 96-86 (Dec 1996), available on Westlaw at 1996 WL 1771364.
40 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Suitability in Annuity
Transactions Model Regulation (Apr 2010), online at http://www.naic.org/store/free/
MDL-275.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
41 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Long-Term Care
Insurance Model Regulation (Jan 2010), online at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-
641.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
42 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-
203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010), codified in various sections of 12 USC.
4 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 ("Card
Act"), Pub L No 111-24, 123 Stat 1734, codified in various sections of 15 USC.
4 See Dodd-Frank § 1411(a)(1), 124 Stat at 2142, codified at 15 USCA § 1639c ("In
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board, no creditor may make a residential
mortgage loan unless . . . the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan.");
Card Act § 109, 124 Stat at 1743, codified at 15 USC § 1665e ("A card issuer may not
open any credit card account . . . unless the card issuer considers the ability of the
consumer to make the required payments under the terms of such account."). Certain
qualified mortgages are exempted from this requirement. See Dodd-Frank
§ 1412(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat at 2145-46. Most commentators agree that ability to repay
rules is a limited version of suitability rules. See Jonathan R. Macey, et al, Helping Law
Catch Up To Markets: Applying Broker-Dealer Law To Subprime Mortgage, 34 J Corp L
789, 836 (2009) ("We take an assessment to pay to be a necessary, but not sufficient,
precondition for a determination of suitability."); Jason Scott Johnston, From Nudges to
Mandates: Dodd-Frank Mortgage Regulation as Case Study *13 (University of Virginia
Law School Working Paper, Dec 2012), online at http://www.masonlec.org/site/
rte uploads/files/Johnston%20nudges%20to%20mandates%20dodd%20frank%20as%20c
ase%20study%20FINAL.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) (noting that the ability to repay
standard is "intentionally, very similar to the 'suitability' standard that applies to
broker/dealers under the federal securities law"); John A. E. Pottow, Ability to Pay *12
(University of Michigan Law School Program in Law and Economics Working Paper,
May 2011), online at http://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/bclbe/Ablility-toPay.pdf (visited
Sept 15, 2013).
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In all of these cases, regulations and statutes implementing
suitability review focus predominantly on the time prior to sale.
For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA") suitability rules are only triggered when a broker
makes a recommendation with respect to an "investment
strategy involving a security or securities."45  Such
recommendations "normally would not create an ongoing duty to
monitor and make subsequent recommendations." 46 Similarly,
FINRA rules only require firms to collect customer information
before making new recommendations. 4 7 The NAIC's suitability
rule for annuities similarly focuses on evaluating whether an
annuity is suitable for a customer prior to its issuance. 48 The
only post-sale obligation imposed on insurers by the NAIC
annuity rule is to "annually provide a report to senior
management . . . reasonably designed to determine the
effectiveness of the [suitability] supervision system, the
exceptions found, and corrective action taken or recommended, if
any."4 9 As described in more detail in Part III, Dodd-Frank's
ability to repay rules similarly focus on pre-sale procedures and
safeguards.50
To be sure, financial regulators do occasionally supplement
suitability rules-as well as other financial regulations-with a
broad requirement that firms maintain compliance programs.51
In some cases, these compliance programs may retrospectively
evaluate procedures designed to ensure suitable sales. However,
there are few (if any) rules requiring compliance programs to
monitor post-sale product data to identify the consequences of
4 FINRA Rule 2111(a).
46 FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25 at 7 (May 18, 2012), available on Westlaw at
2012 WL 1898671.
47 Id at 12.
4 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Suitability in Annuity
Transactions Model Regulation § 2 at 275-1 (cited in note 40). The NAIC rule applies to
any recommendation involving an annuity transaction by an insurer. Notably, a
recommendation must result in the purchase, exchange, or replacement of an annuity to
fall under the purview of the rule. See id § 5(G) at 275-2. At the time of sale, an insurer
must record any recommendation made to the consumer that would be subject to the
rule. See id § 6(E)(1) at 275-5. Twenty-seven states have adopted the most recent version
of this law in "substantially similar" form. See id at ST-275-3-8.
9 Id at § 6(F)()(f) at 275-6.
'0 See Part III.
s' See, for example, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory
Highlights: Fall 2012, online at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201210 cfpb
supervisory-highlights-fall-2012.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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failed suitability procedures. Nor are such compliance programs
required to report problems to regulators or proactively take
corrective action.
B. Post-Sale Obligations and Financial Product Suitability
Despite the pre-sale focus of financial product suitability
regulation, the tangible consumer product framework suggests
that regulatory requirements aimed at post-sale review of
suitability determinations may be appropriate. First, as with
safety problems in tangible consumer products, firms cannot
always accurately assess the suitability of financial products on
a pre-sale basis. In some cases, firms may fail to fully anticipate
how their products will operate in unusual market conditions.
As FINRA explained in a 2012 release on consumer suitability
and sales supervision, "[e]very product presents risks that may
cause the product to perform differently than anticipated,
particularly when market conditions have changed." 52 For this
reason, FINRA recommends as a "best practice" that financial
firms review, on a post-sale basis, the effectiveness of suitability
procedures for new products. 53 Similarly, the UK's Financial
Services Authority recently released guidance on the creation of
structured products, which advised firms to monitor products
"through to the end of [their] life cycle." 5 4
In other cases, firms may fail to accurately evaluate the
suitability of financial products at the time of sale because they
do not elicit relevant information from consumers.55 This might
52 FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-03 at 7 (Jan 17, 2012), available on Westlaw at 2012
WL 171510.
ss See NASD Release 05-26 at 1, 8 (Apr 6, 2005), available on Westlaw at 2005 WL
775434 (stating that firms should "track and monitor customer complaints and
grievances relating to new products" and formally recommending "post-approval follow-
up and review" for new products to "assess product performance, determine whether
product limitations and other post-sale compliance requirements are met, and to
evaluate whether market conditions have altered the risks associated with the
product.").
5 Financial Services Authority, Guidance Consultation, Retail Product
Development and Governance - Structured Products Review 2 (Nov 2011), online at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/guidance/gel 127.pdf(visited Sept 15, 2013).
* See, for example, Order Accepting Offer of Settlement, Department of
Enforcement v Buswell, et al, FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding No 2009017275301, *26-27
(Sept 27, 2011), online at http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.aspx?
DocNB=22668 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (finding that "the firm's new account application
process was flawed" and that "the reviewing principal was unable to obtain an accurate
picture of the customer's financial status, investment objectives, and investment history
409] 421
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occur because the company's questions are confusing or
incomplete. Alternatively, salespeople may simply neglect to
inquire about relevant information due to inadequate training.56
Another reason that firms' pre-sale suitability procedures
may fail is that employees or agents may inadvertently or
intentionally flout those rules. Suitability rules are generally in
place precisely because salespeople have incentives to sell
certain products in order to maximize commissions, bonuses,
and short-term profits.57 Accordingly, unethical salespeople may
intentionally subvert suitability rules in order to sell, and earn,
more.58 Perhaps more commonly, individual sellers of financial
products may push ambiguous boundaries to justify unsuitable
sales because doing so promotes their financial interests.
The second feature of suitability rules that potentially
makes the imposition of post-sale review obligations feasible is
that, as with safety problems in tangible consumer products,
individual firms are comparatively well-situated to detect
suitability problems that were not identified at the time of sale.
Sales of unsuitable products will, of course, often result in
consumer complaints when consumers ultimately realize the
negative results of their purchase. For instance, a consumer may
realize that she was sold an unsuitable annuity when she learns
that she must pay a large surrender fee in order to withdraw
when reviewing a transaction for suitability").
56 See, for example, Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent, Department of
Enforcement v Steven Krasner, FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding No 2009019995901 *2
(Sept 7, 2011), online at http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.aspx?DocNB=
21968 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (finding that "the [ ] database and computer platform that
[the respondent] used to place trades, as well as the account statements that were
mailed to [the customer] each month, inaccurately indicated that the investment
objective was speculation. In his conversations with [the customer], [the respondent]
never confirmed the accuracy of the investment objective").
s' Engel and McCoy, 80 Tex L Rev at 1318-21 (cited in note 38).
8 Such salespeople may systematically report false information, elicit inaccurate
information from consumers, or otherwise undermine internal procedures designed to
ensure suitable sales. See, for example, Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent,
Department of Enforcement v Jan Henderson, FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding No
20090195139 *2 (July 13, 2011), online at http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/
viewdocument.aspx?DocNB-18848 (visited Sept 15, 2013) (finding that respondent
"switch[ed] customers from their existing fixed and/or variable annuities into a [specific]
variable annuity thereby improperly earning additional commissions at the expense of
customers who paid substantial surrender fees"). See also Sally Balch Hurme, Who's in
the Batter Box?: Regulating and Litigating Unsuitable Sales of Variable Annuities, 1
Phoenix L Rev 365, 386 (2008) (describing a case where respondent "sold three annuities
to a terminally ill eighty-six-year-old man").
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funds.59 Alternatively, a consumer sold an unsuitable mortgage
may only realize that fact when he does not have the ability to
pay his monthly bill when the initial teaser rate ends. 60
Relative to their counterparts in tangible consumer
markets, sellers of retail financial products actually have a
superior ability to detect these consequences of unsuitable sales.
This is because financial products are contracts that typically
create long-term relationships requiring regular and detailed
contact with customers. Financial firms' ordinary business
operations thus provide them with the capacity to spot unusual
patterns of defaults, delinquencies, surrender charges, or other
markers of unsuitable sales.
Individual financial firms are well-situated not only to
identify the consequences of unsuitable sales, but also to identify
their sources. Firms routinely evaluate their employees' and
agents' performances; like all companies, retail financial firms
have an interest in the productivity of their employees and
independent contractors. This ordinary business process affords
financial firms an opportunity to identify salespeople who fail to
comply with procedures designed to ensure suitable sales.
Similarly, firms obviously track the performance of individual
financial products in order to assess trends and market needs.
Here too, retrospective evaluation in the ordinary course of
business should allow firms to identify unsuitable sales
relatively easily.
The third and final feature of suitability rules that makes
post-sale review obligations feasible is that, by proactively
addressing unsuitable sales, firms can avoid harm to individual
consumers. In many cases, the sale of an unsuitable product can
be remedied through the provision of a replacement product or
" For example, in 2005, a class action lawsuit was filed against insurer Allianz,
which was alleged to have sold actuarially unsuitable annuities to elderly consumers.
See Chris Serres, A Split Decision in Allianz Life Annuity Lawsuit, Minneapolis Star
Tribune Al (Oct 14, 2009). Allianz reportedly enticed these customers with significant
interest bonuses; unfortunately, it imposed even heavier fees on early withdrawals from
the annuity accounts. For instance, the named plaintiff, a sixty-five-year-old woman,
received a 10 percent up-front bonus on her investment of $216,189-but would have to
pay surrender charges of 12.5 percent for withdrawals within the first fifteen years.
While this arrangement might prove beneficial to a younger customer, it prevented many
purchasers from withdrawing their money penalty-free for a period well beyond their life
expectancy.
6 See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr, The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 Conn L Rev 963,
1022, 1023 n 302 (2009).
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the waiver of a contractual condition. These options are largely
analogous to a product manufacturer recalling a tangible
product or devising a supplemental patch for a product. In either
the tangible good or financial product situations, the selling firm
can reduce the risk of post-sale harm caused by the defective
product by using information that it has obtained in the course
of its everyday business operations.
In sum, each of the three justifications for imposing post-
sale obligations on manufacturers of tangible consumer products
has potential application to suitability rules for intangible
consumer financial products. Perhaps not surprisingly, though,
so too do the critiques of such obligations in the tangible product
market. Imposing post-sale obligations on retail financial firms
may accomplish little if firms resist corrective action for fear of
lawsuits.61 And such obligations could, in theory, cause sellers of
retail financial products to intentionally turn a blind eye to
regulatory violations in order to avoid triggering their post-sale
obligations in the first place. 62
Ultimately, the feasibility, benefits, and costs of any
potential post-sale suitability review regime depend on
numerous factors that are context-specific. But the exclusive
focus of suitability regimes on the point of sale is neither
inevitable nor obviously desirable. Given the parallels between
suitability and tangible product safety, there is at least reason
to consider whether the suitability requirements imposed on
sellers of financial products should include post-sale monitoring,
reporting, and corrective action obligations.
III. APPLYING THE PRODUCT RECALL FRAMEWORK TO THE
CFPB's ABILITY TO REPAY RULES
Part II demonstrates that suitability requirements share
some key characteristics with product safety requirements that
may justify imposing on financial firms post-sale monitoring,
reporting, and corrective action requirements. But it does little
to illustrate how such an approach might operate on the ground
floor. This Part attempts this more fine-grained analysis by
looking at the CFPB's recent attempt to implement limited
61 See Part I.B.
61 See id.
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suitability rules in the mortgage sales context. 63 Of course, both
the details for how best to implement a post-sale enforcement
regime and the ultimate wisdom of doing so are likely to vary,
even within the broad domain of suitability rules. Thus, a post-
sale enforcement regime for ensuring suitable mortgages might
look very different than one designed to ensure appropriate
credit card limits, for instance, as unsuitable credit card loans
are particularly profitable for issuers.64 But exploring the
practical application of a post-sale enforcement regime in the
specific context of the ability to repay rules helps both to
concretize the core idea of this Article and to frame some of the
potential difficulties and objections.
A. New Ability to Repay Rules
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that a mortgage lender make
a good faith effort to verify a borrower's ability to repay a loan
before actually making such a loan.65 To do so, lenders must
consider eight factors: (1) current or reasonably expected income
or assets; (2) current employment status; (3) the monthly
payment on the covered transaction; (4) the monthly payment on
any simultaneous loan; (5) the monthly payment for mortgage-
related obligations; (6) current debt obligations, alimony, and
child support; (7) the monthly debt-to-income ratio or residual
income; and (8) credit history.66 In effect, these rules impose a
limited suitability requirement on mortgage lenders that applies
to one core element of the transaction: the consumers' ability to
repay.67 Dodd-Frank also establishes a presumption of
compliance with this rule for purposes of litigation when
consumers are sold "qualified mortgages."68 "Qualified
mortgages" may not have any particularly risky features, such
as negative amortization or balloon payments, and must meet
minimum underwriting standards.69
6 See Part I.
6 See, for example, Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of
Credit Card Debt, U Ill L Rev 375, 385 (2007).
6 Dodd-Frank § 1411(a)(2), 124 Stat at 2142, codified at 15 USC § 1639c.
66 Dodd-Frank § 1411(a)(3),124 Stat at 2143, codified at 15 USC § 1639c(a)(3).
67 See text accompanying note 57.
6 Dodd-Frank § 1412(b)(1), 124 Stat at 2145, codified at 15 USC § 1639c(b)(1).
69 See Dodd-Frank § 1412(b)(2), 124 Stat at 2145-48, codified at 15 USC
§ 1639c(b)(2).
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In January 2013, the CFPB promulgated final rules
implementing these provisions.7 0 The CFPB's rules provide
lenders with flexibility in the underwriting models they use to
actually assess the eight statutorily-prescribed underwriting
factors.71 They also create an absolute litigation safe harbor for
loans that meet the definition of a qualified mortgage and are
not "higher-priced."72 "Higher-priced" mortgages are determined
by a complex formula that roughly captures the subprime
market.73 Such higher-priced mortgages are entitled only to a
rebuttable presumption of compliance with the ability to repay
rules, even if they are qualified mortgages.74
B. Reconsidering the Ability to Repay Rules in Light of the
Post-Sale Product Safety Framework
How might the post-sale product safety framework apply to
the CFPB's proposed rules implementing Dodd-Frank's ability to
repay requirement? First, and perhaps most importantly, this
framework suggests the possible wisdom of requiring creditors
to back-test the accuracy of their particular underwriting models
by assessing whether ex post data on actual default rates match
the ex ante predictions of their models.75 As with sellers of
tangible goods, even well-meaning financial firms cannot fully
anticipate the various ways in which their particular
'o See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Ability-to-Repay and Qualified
Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed Reg 6407
(Jan 30, 2013) (amending 12 CFR Part 1026).
71 See id at 6408 ("Creditors must generally use reasonably reliable third-party
records to verify the information they use to evaluate the factors.").
72 See id at 6409 ("[The final rule applies the new ability-to-repay requirements but
creates a strong presumption for . . . qualified mortgages. [ I [I]f a prime loan satisfies
the qualified mortgage criteria . . . it will be conclusively presumed that the creditor
made a good faith and reasonable determination of the consumer's ability to repay.").
7 "Higher-priced" mortgages are defined by a 2008 Federal Reserve Rule, which
subjected only these mortgages to an ability to repay requirement. See 12 CFR
§ 226.35(a). The definition targeted loans with interest rates substantially above those
prevailing in the market place. See 12 CFR § 226.35(a)(1).
" See 78 Fed Reg at 6408 (cited in note 70) ("The final rule provides a rebuttable
presumption for higher-priced mortgage loans . . . if creditors follow [newly
strengthened] requirements.").
7s One potential first step towards promoting back-testing would be for the CFPB to
use the default and foreclosure database mandated by Section 1447 of Dodd Frank to
determine if certain lenders are outliers. The proposal here, however, would go one step
beyond this by requiring individual firms to back-test their own models and potentially
report troubling results to the CFPB.
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underwriting models may fail to identify consumers who do not,
in fact, have a realistic ability to repay a loan.76
Evaluating product performance with post-loan data could
allow firms to identify problems with their underwriting models
that were not discernible ex ante. For instance, such testing
might reveal that a certain segment of consumers-perhaps
those with high debt levels and volatile incomes-are at a much
greater risk of default than the model predicts. Alternatively,
back-testing might reveal that a firm's underwriting model
works well in some geographic regions but not others, or that
consumers who work with a particular broker or group of
brokers experience unexpectedly high default rates.
A requirement to back-test ability to repay assessments is
consistent with the safe harbor and presumption of compliance
embedded within the current ability to repay rules.7 These
rules limit the potential liability of creditors, but not the
prospect of future regulatory scrutiny. In fact, the liability-
limiting safe harbor and presumption in current law actually
provide support for implementing a back-testing requirement on
lenders: without systematic ex post scrutiny, lenders would face
limited pressure to reassess the accuracy of their underwriting
models under the current regime.78
The second potential lesson offered by the post-sale product
safety lens is that firms that do identify problems with their
underwriting models through back-testing should be required
and/or incentivized to report those problems to the CFPB. 79 As
with individual firms, the CFPB has imperfect knowledge about
how best to assure consumers' ability to repay. By receiving
feedback from individual companies about ways in which their
underwriting standards fail to achieve this regulatory objective,
the CFPB can consider the need to alter its rules or to request
that other creditors back-test their models to look for particular
anomalies. Mandatory reporting of potential problems with
underwriting models to the CFPB would also encourage firms to
take these problems seriously by subjecting them to the
1 See Part I.B.
7 See 78 Fed Reg at 6408 (cited in note 70).
7' Lenders might eventually face some media or consumer scrutiny if their
underwriting models performed poorly. But the sub-prime mortgage crisis suggests that
such pressure may not be sufficient to dissuade lenders from making unsafe loans.
79 See Part I.B.
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independent, and more objective, analysis of the CFPB on the
extent of the problem.
The post-sale product safety framework also suggests
potential methods for successfully inducing firms to report
problems with their underwriting models to the CFPB. For
instance, the CFPB could implement a program similar to the
CPSC's fast track program, agreeing not to take any regulatory
action if firms voluntarily report and correct observed problems
with their underwriting models and practices.80 And, as in the
fast track program, the CFPB could refuse to extend such
protection to creditors that delayed reporting potential failures
of their underwriting standards.
Third and finally, it might well be sensible for mortgage law
to mimic the law of product recalls by requiring creditors to offer
mortgage modifications to consumers who, at the time of sale,
were incorrectly informed about their ability to repay a
mortgage.81 Just like an unsafe tangible product, consumers who
are sold mortgages that they predictably cannot afford face a
very real risk of serious harm. By modifying the original
mortgage product, it may be possible to limit the resulting
consumer harm.82 Such modifications might be less costly than
their analogue in the tangible product sphere, as redrafting
contracts is generally easier than retrofitting or recalling
defective tangible products. Arguably, though, it might violate
the spirit of the Dodd-Frank ability to repay safe harbor, which
strives to limit liability risk for qualified loans, which are
presumed to be relatively safe.83
As above, the law governing tangible products also offers
some possible lessons for effective implementation of any such
post-sale corrective action rules in the mortgage context. For
instance, given the evidence that many firms are reluctant to
issue product recalls because doing so could open them up to
lawsuits,84 it might be sensible to offer legal immunity to firms
8 See Part I.A.
s' To be clear, this proposal would not apply to borrowers who were correctly
determined to have a reasonable ability to repay at the time of sale, but whose
circumstances changed after the sale in a manner that could not plausibly have been
known at the time of sale.
8 See Engel and McCoy, 80 Tex L Rev at 1319 (cited in note 38) (proposing that
those who are sold unsuitable loans should have the right to sue for loan reformation).
* See Part III.A.
8 See Part I.B.
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that offer CFPB-approved modifications, at least to the extent
that those firms are subject to liability risk in the first place.
Alternatively, the availability of punitive damages could be
explicitly tied to the extent to which a lender proactively
remedied any problems with its underwriting models.
Any of these proposals, of course, would face a variety of
legitimate objections and complications. For instance,
originators' sale of mortgage loans to secondary markets might
substantially complicate the logistics of imposing post-sale
obligations on originators.85 This, in turn, could undermine the
availability of credit. Even if this difficulty could be overcome,
imposing new obligations on creditors would likely increase the
cost of credit. 86 It is even conceivable that placing post-sale
obligations on firms to correct flawed underwriting models could
exacerbate systemic risks if failures in these models were
pervasive and correlated across companies. At the same time,
there is substantial debate about how pervasive the underlying
problem of lenders offering unaffordable loans will continue to
be, given recalibrated expectations about real estate markets.87
And, of course, the actual effectiveness of the post-sale
monitoring, reporting, and corrective action ideas explored above
would depend on innumerable factors, including their actual
implementation.
Detailed analysis of these complicated trade-offs is beyond
this Article's scope. Thus, this Article does not contend that
imposing post-sale monitoring, reporting, and corrective action
obligations on sellers of retail financial products generally, or
mortgage providers in particular, would ultimately be wise
social policy. Instead, its core argument is that the ideas
generated by applying the post-sale tangible product safety
framework to issues such as ability to repay rules are worthy of
serious consideration. Ultimately, the wisdom of imposing post-
sale obligations on consumer financial firms depends on various
context-specific factors.
85 See generally Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage
Securitization, 88 Ind L J 213 (2013).
8 See Todd J. Zywicki and Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of
Subprime Lending, 80 U Colo L Rev 1, 1, 4 (2009) (emphasizing that imposing regulatory
costs on lenders will result in higher costs for borrowers).
87 Compare Pottow, Ability to Pay at *27-36 (cited in note 44), with Zywicki and
Adamson, 80 U Colo L Rev at 57-58 (cited in note 86).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Tangible and intangible consumer products are similar in
many ways, so distinctions in the legal regimes that govern
them merit attention. Nowhere was this intuition better
captured than in now-Senator Elizabeth Warren's initial
proposal to create the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five
chance of bursting into flames and burning down your
house. But it is possible to refinance an existing home
with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five chance of
putting the family out on the street-and the mortgage
won't even carry a disclosure of that fact to the
homeowner. Similarly, it's impossible to change the price
on a toaster once it has been purchased. But long after
the papers have been signed, it is possible to triple the
price of the credit used to finance the purchase of that
appliance, even if the customer meets all the credit
terms, in full and on time. Why are consumers safe when
they purchase tangible consumer products with cash, but
when they sign up for routine financial products like
mortgages and credit cards they are left at the mercy of
their creditors?88
Building on this intuition, this Article suggests that the web
of statutory and regulatory rules governing the post-sale
obligations of firms to monitor, report, and correct product safety
problems is also potentially applicable to intangible consumer
financial products. As with product safety, regulatory issues in
the domain of consumer financial protection often involve ex
ante uncertainty about effective regulatory compliance. And as
with product safety, firms may have a comparative advantage,
vis-A-vis regulators, in detecting and mitigating the
consequences of regulatory problems as they arise.
This Article illustrates these points through the prism of
suitability rules generally, and the CFPB's ability to repay rules
in particular. But various other mechanisms of consumer
financial protection might also be amenable to this analysis. For
instance, the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure
8 Warren, 5 Democracy at 8 (cited in note 9).
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requirements, like suitability rules, may be hard to assess ex
ante; the consequences of poor disclosure may be particularly
visible to firms; and proactive market intervention may be able
to mitigate the negative consequences of failed disclosure.89
Similarly, rules prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
impermissible consumer characteristics may be amenable to
post-sale monitoring, reporting, and correction obligations for
firms. Here too, firms face a limited ability to gauge compliance
prior to sale, are reasonably well-situated to detect the
consequences of ineffective compliance, and might be able to
mitigate the consequences through proactive measures after the
sale. Ultimately, the law governing product safety may offer
important lessons for effectively regulating consumer financial
products that extend beyond those that originally inspired
Elizabeth Warren to propose the CFPB.
89 For some similar reasons, securities issuers have a duty under current law to
update disclosure statements that were accurate when made but subsequently became
inaccurate due to changed circumstances. See Steven E. Bochner and Samir Bukhari,
The Duty to Update and Disclosure Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current
Disclosure Initiatives, 7 Stan J L, Bus, & Fin 225, 246 (2002).
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